Philosophy is unlike science in the following way: In science there is a single project of clarifying our collective Mind. In philosophy, each one is trying to clarify his or her own mind—as if they were a solitary intellectual island. Part of what may be confusing here is that the best way of clarifying one’s own mind is to discuss things with others. This is indispensible really; there is no way of doing philosophy alone. But—be honest about it!—when you do philosophy, the pretence is there: the pretence that your mind is (a good representative of) the collective Mind. Actually, there is a double pretence: sometimes that we are thinking completely alone, and sometimes that we are thinking completely together, completely sharing in one collective Mind. – We move in philosophy between those two pretences. The pretence here—the illusion and confusion—is about what having a mind amounts to: about the very idea of thinking completely alone, and about the very idea of completely sharing in one collective mind (which is just the other side of the solipsistic coin).
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Philosophers like Plato seem to think sometimes that if people only saw what they need to do, they would immediately start doing it.
This is, of course, fooling themselves, but in שa way, we might have to fool ourselves in this way. We need to “forget” how hard it is to do what we need to do, and what we ask them to do: search their souls. We need to forget that there is no foolproof prescription that can be given here for people to follow blindly. When you ask people to search their soul, it is almost bound to sound offensive to them, and be frustrating to you. You have to make them want to do it themselves. And more: you have to make them feel (think is not enough) that they will not be able to do without it. Then, you also have a duty not to leave them alone. In discussing meaning, especially in devising theories of meaning, the category of meaning is often treated as a waste basket. That is, it is not treated as a clear category, or used as a distinct notion, but includes a heap of unsorted stuff.
How does that happen? - In accounting for meaning, we try to isolate the phenomenon of meaning. For that end we distinguish between what a sentence means and what it does. But when we make this distinction, we almost always (possibly always) have a clearer idea what we intend by “does” than by “means.” The unclarity runs deep: We somehow forget that ‘to mean something’ is to do something. Meaning is a subcategory of doing, and Logic treats of action, not of meaning. Our distinction was therefore not completely successful. We did not really isolate the phenomenon of meaning properly. As a result of this forgetfulness, “meaning” becomes a general name for all the other things that a sentence does - all the things beside what it “does,” the things about which we don’t have any clear idea. Namely, it becomes a waste basket. We hide that unclarity by assuming that there is such a thing as “the normal use of language,” or “the normal way to mean.” This is supposed to give us a (feeling that we have a) distinct notion of meaning. (Actually, there are supposed to be two such “normal” uses of language: one to state factual truths, and another to express values.) The only thing that we know about this “normal” way of using language is that it is normal. That is, we think we latched on to some idea, but we haven't made sure it has any content. The truth is that we have an idea without content; that is, we have no idea. And so, this “idea” doesn’t really give us any distinct notion regarding what we intend by “meaning something.” In particular it doesn’t give us any clear idea what we do with the true-false distinction. We differentiate between kinds of evaluative propositions: we distinguish between aesthetic judgments, moral judgments, and judgments of taste. We set apart morality and manners, what is moral and what is legal, acting morally and acting tactfully; even religion and morality are sometimes told apart.
But these are almost never truly distinctions. That is, we almost never have any clear idea about the categories we are distinguishing, and most of the problem is that we don’t really have any clear idea what morality is. I often would like to say in such cases that it would be better to say—point out—that we evaluate in different ways. But that doesn’t seem to be important enough to say. When we make those “distinctions” we almost always treat morality as a waste basket for all those evaluations and whatnots that we cannot really understand—or rather, for which we find it hard to take responsibility. |
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Academia.edu page Previous Notes Excluded Middle Moral Clarification The Will in the Tractatus Morality and Creation Moral Skepticism Understanding language and understanding music - The unity of a sentence, and the unity of a salad In what way secondary and absolute uses are nonsense (2) Another way of using nonsense Ethics as an Aspect of Philosophy - In what sense is there an ethical point to the Tractatus Interpretation as finding a way to say what the writer does - the Tractatus for example In what way secondary and absolute uses are nonsense Art is a matter of use - two claims, and a thought about the relation to ethics Both Aspects at the Same Time - in connection with Wittgenstein's early views on ethics Thinking and Willing Subjects in the Tractatus Two notions of "Family Resemblance" and a relation to Aspect-Perception The experience of thinking The Figurative and the Literal: two kinds of picturing: making reality thinkable What’s the Point of Figurative Language? ‘Juliet is the sun’ again – What kind of metaphor is it? Secondary and Absolute Uses of Terms – the Problem of Irresoluteness Secondary and Absolute Uses of Terms – the Problem of Examples Wrestling with Nonsense—A Protest: Absolute Senses, Secondary Senses, Gulfs between People, Difficulties of Reality, and Philosophy. What’s so bad about pain? Between Romantics and Anatomy: Religion and Pornography in Hanoch Levin The transcendence of ethics – two views Pain as form of behavior and pain as private object Archives
November 2019
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Blogroll Kelly Jolley - Quantum Est In Rebus Inane Duncan Richter - Language Goes on Holiday Matt Pianalto - Problems of Life Ben Pierce - Expensive Coffee Lars Hertzberg - Language is things we do Breaking the Silence - Israeli Soldiers Talk about the Occupied Territories Hans Sluga Blog Mists on the Riverss - Ed Mooney Tags
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