We imagine pieces of art to be encapsulated, canned, value. Value preserved in bronze; value conserved on canvas. Value, we imagine, is at last tangible. We try to materially consume it by buying it—making it ours. Apparently, people are willing to pay, and so works of art indeed have such commodity value. But it is not the only value they have. (There can even be an argument that says that it is logically impossible for works of art to only have this kind of value.) And in any case, as opposed to their commodity value, the artistic value of works of art is not something materially consumable.
Here is a family of suggestions: The artistic value of a work of art is typically like the value of a word. It can be educational—for we are educated by words. To attempt to consume a work of art is, thus, one way in which we may refuse education. And art, like words, can also be meaning-conferring: Works of art can make sense of things for us, and teach us how to make sense of things. Attempting to consume art is thus also a way of failing to ask the question of meaningfulness—to see, to share, the problem. And artistic value can also be like the value of conversation—of someone saying something to you, inviting you to say something back. – Or at least trying; for so many works of art come from wounds that are otherwise inexpressible, and so many works of art have within themselves a wonder: “Have I said something?” To attempt to consume a work of art is therefore also one way in which we may fail to listen, or even refuse to meet another mind.