Now, we may think of ethics as one of those topics—a domain among other domains—and of the propositions of ethics as concerned with one part or aspect of reality. But I would like to resist this. I would like to say rather that ethics is as general as logic is—not necessarily that they have the same sort of generality, but that they are equally not domains among other domains. They both speak not to particular concerns, particular topics, or particular groups of propositions, but to all concerns, all topics, and all propositions. All propositions, since they are propositions, are logical constructions, and in this minimal sense belong to logic. In parallel, all proposition, since we have them in our language, allow us to give voice to things we care about, and in this minimal sense belong to ethics.
But this leaves us with a question: If the difference between logic and ethics is not like the difference between logic and pomology, if ethics is not just another domain among domains, then what is it? And what is its relation to logic? And that gives rise to the need to characterize moral clarification as apart from logical clarification.