consistent with the belief that the degree of value all propositions share is zero.
However, he continues, the
claim rather more naturally suggests […] that each proposition (the fact that it is, and hence the possible fact that it pictures) is of some value, possessed of a non-zero degree of worth or significance that it shares with every other proposition.
(WORDS, WAXING AND WANING: Ethics in/and/of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus)
The idea of numeric value of propositions, as well as the idea of them having some “degree” of value, should give us pause. There is something weird about it; it makes the notion of proposition foreign.
Not that there is no room for measuring the value of a proposition. So a question remains how to measure the value of propositions--in what terms? - Suggestion: the propositions of science all have the value, saying something meaningful. That is, with them we have a world.
(This makes me inclined to take issue with Wittgenstein's claim that all those propositions have equal value. Different kinds of propositions give us a world in different ways.)
Anyway, there is room for measuring the value of a proposition of science, and for comparing the values of different such propositions. When it comes to ethics, however, Wittgenstein has no notion of measuring propositions, or any notion of those propositions having degrees of value. He is rather interested in ABSOLUTE value. And the word 'Absolute' takes us beyond measurement.
Now ask: what is the value of a moral sentence? in what terms may we capture that value?