- Tractatus-Wittgenstein’s view of moral language as nonsense is not a realistic characterization of moral language, (not a good phenomenology of moral thinking), but a byproduct of a theory—an undesired byproduct of a faulty theory.
- We should reject the Tractatus view that moral propositions are meaningless.
- We should rather say that they have their own kind of meaningfulness.
- We can do so on the authority of later Wittgenstein, who allows for a plurality of kinds of meaningfulness.
- Wittgenstein cannot really account for moral language in the Tractatus, and we need the resources of his later philosophy to do that.
- Wittgenstein's later views on ethics are better than his earlier views because they allow for meaningful moral thought and talk.
- Wittgenstein Tractatus account for morality is more of a failure than an account.
- Tractatus-Wittgenstein just had a blind spot, caused by his own views, regarding the logic, the meaningfulness, the grammar, of moral language.
- The Tractatus view of language is so narrow as to leave no room for ethics.
- Tractatus-Wittgenstein has to categorize moral propositions as, declare them, nonsense because he unwittingly left himself no other way of dealing with them.
- Wittgenstein’s view of moral language as nonsense is a mere byproduct of his views in the Tractatus, to which he tried to be committed, but ultimately was not satisfied with.
- There are indications of dissatisfaction with the account for ethics in both the Tractatus and the Lecture on Ethics:
a. In the Tractatus, despite saying that moral propositions are nonsensical, Wittgenstein refrains from giving them the exact same status as to metaphysical propositions, which are just discarded, tossed as worthless. Moral propositions rather remain in a kind of philosophical limbo—meaningless but not discarded, nonsense but not unrespectful.
b. In the Lecture, Wittgenstein is undecidedly hovering between saying that moral propositions are nonsense, and saying that he has a deep respect for ethics. By the time of the Lecture he realized the problem of saying simply that moral propositions are nonsensical.
In summary:
We don’t need to take too seriously the Tractatus view of morality.
a. since even in the Tractatus the claim that moral propositions are meaningless is halfhearted;
b. since they are anyway just by products of a dubious view;
c. since Wittgenstein later criticized his earlier views;
d. since the Tractatus characterization of ethics is obviously wrong: it does not capture the spirit of ethics.
All of the statements below are false, or at least very misleading.
2 Comments
Ed
5/27/2014 08:05:51 pm
Dear Reshef,
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Reshef
5/28/2014 05:10:27 am
Thanks Ed.
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Academia.edu page Previous Notes Excluded Middle Moral Clarification The Will in the Tractatus Morality and Creation Moral Skepticism Understanding language and understanding music - The unity of a sentence, and the unity of a salad In what way secondary and absolute uses are nonsense (2) Another way of using nonsense Ethics as an Aspect of Philosophy - In what sense is there an ethical point to the Tractatus Interpretation as finding a way to say what the writer does - the Tractatus for example In what way secondary and absolute uses are nonsense Art is a matter of use - two claims, and a thought about the relation to ethics Both Aspects at the Same Time - in connection with Wittgenstein's early views on ethics Thinking and Willing Subjects in the Tractatus Two notions of "Family Resemblance" and a relation to Aspect-Perception The experience of thinking The Figurative and the Literal: two kinds of picturing: making reality thinkable What’s the Point of Figurative Language? ‘Juliet is the sun’ again – What kind of metaphor is it? Secondary and Absolute Uses of Terms – the Problem of Irresoluteness Secondary and Absolute Uses of Terms – the Problem of Examples Wrestling with Nonsense—A Protest: Absolute Senses, Secondary Senses, Gulfs between People, Difficulties of Reality, and Philosophy. What’s so bad about pain? Between Romantics and Anatomy: Religion and Pornography in Hanoch Levin The transcendence of ethics – two views Pain as form of behavior and pain as private object Archives
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