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Secondary and Absolute Uses of Terms – the Problem of Examples

6/30/2012

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For any proper discussion of the phenomena of absolute and secondary senses, we would need examples to work with. Here are two apparently clear examples of use of words in a secondary sense: ‘Wednesday fat,’ ‘E is yellow.’ Here are two examples of uses of words in an absolute sense: ‘I’m absolutely safe in the hands of God,’ ‘I wonder at the existence of the world.’

Now, it is not easy to give examples for absolute and secondary uses, and it is not always easy to detect that a particular use is in fact secondary or absolute. I can go as far as saying that it is never safe to give examples in this discussion, or to declare that a certain use was absolute or secondary. On top of that, people often resist the suggestion that a certain term was used in an absolute or a secondary sense—even, and sometimes especially, when they are the speakers. The resistance people—philosophers especially—have in these matters, when it exists, is greater than usual.

There are several issues about the examples here. One problem is connected to what is essential to absolute and secondary uses. I take it that it is internal to such uses that perfectly capable speakers may take those uses for nonsense. (I’ll try to explain that some other time.) And to that extent, it is hard to detect them as it is hard to detect that one’s language has been derailed into nonsensicality. People—especially philosophers—who neither want nor intend to be implicated in nonsense tend to dislike the discovery that they are.

There is also a shallower, and much more annoying, source for the difficulty of giving examples of absolute and secondary uses: Scholars tend to accept as valid only examples Wittgenstein himself gave—for both secondary and absolute senses. (This is why I could relatively easily get away with the examples I gave so far.) It should be noted, however, that Wittgenstein himself gave examples for secondary uses of words that I take to be less than obvious, like ‘calculating in the head,’ and ‘playing at trains.’ If anyone but Wittgenstein would have tried to use these as examples, I suspect they would have faced a lot more suspicion and resistance.  

Now, I don’t wish to only complain about this. To an extent, this is as it should be. For the unclarity here is of the very essence of the phenomena under investigation. It is a natural part of what happens when we flirt with nonsense. This means, incidentally, that even with Wittgenstein’s examples, we should not let him get away with them easily. We should probe them, and verify that they are indeed examples for secondary or absolute senses. At the same time, however, it also means that absolute and secondary uses of language may be more common than we expect.

Here are some more controversial, and perhaps less expected, examples of terms that may be used in secondary or absolute senses: the idea that we can legislate to ourselves, or deceive ourselves, or control ourselves, or know ourselves; the idea that pain is an internal private object; the idea that we can look into someone’s eyes; the idea that we can see in the imagination; the idea that full and just restitution would require turning time backwards; and the idea that God is omniscient (think of how this idea is typically treated in discussions about the problem of evil).

Now, I said that those terms may be used in secondary or absolute senses, not that they have to be. And this is connected to another problem with giving examples in this context. The fact that a term is used in a secondary or an absolute sense is not written on its sleeve. Both secondary- and absolute-sense are categories of use. And typically, the same expression may be used in different ways—both literal and figurative.

Even with the most well-known example of secondary sense, ‘Wednesday is fat’—it is not necessarily the case that any use of the expression is secondary. If I’m on a special diet, for instance, in which I can eat fatty things on Wednesdays, then this gives us a perfectly good literal way of understanding the expression: a perfectly good literal way for straightening out the expression.

The abundance of possible uses may lead to misunderstandings about how a particular expression was used in a particular case. For an expression to function as an example, that is, what needs to be settled is the way it is used in that particular case—not the words it contains. And since other possibilities of use always exist, perfectly good cases of usage of expressions in secondary or absolute sense may be missed: They may be rejected as such examples by someone whose mind is fixed on another kind of use of the expression.

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